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The Tunisian constitution of 27 January 2014 was deemed essentially compatible with international 
human rights principles and standards. These were adopted at the outcome of a dual process, which 
was underway both inside the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and outside it, between the 
NCA and civil society stakeholders. Three successive drafts fell considerably short of expectations 
(6 August 2012, 14 December 2012 and 22 April 2013). The fourth draft (1 June 2013) was still 
fraught with 20 or so fundamental divergences. These were resolved, thanks to the National Dialogue 
in cooperation with the ad hoc “consensus commission” (lajnet tawafuqat) within the NCA, which is 
chaired by Mustapha Ben Jaafar (President of the NCA). The final text was overwhelmingly adopted 
on 26 January 2014 by 200 votes, with 12 against and four abstentions. It was promulgated on 10 
February.  
This EU Spring report seeks to address citizens’ rights. However, before examining the dynamics at 
work (internal and external) and the logic of voting within the NCA (Part II), we would like to make 
three points. The first point relates to the categories of citizen rights (article 21 to 48). The constitution 
enshrines all rights - in philosophical terms, rights-freedoms and rights-entitlements, and in 
generational terms, the rights of the three generations of rights. It even outlines a mini-theory of 
limitations with a regulatory value (article 49): restrictions to freedoms can only be put in place “to 
protect the rights of others or for reasons of public security, national defence or public morals”. These 
restrictions are accompanied by a clause with a double safeguard: they can only be implemented “in 
case of necessity” and in abidance with the “principle of proportionality”. The second point concerns 
the oversized role of the state. It can be described in the form of a paradox: as much as the members 
of the assembly are wary of the state as the censor of freedoms, they are equally ready to place their 
trust in the state – the Rule of Law, the Welfare State, the Social State and the postcolonial Guardian 
State. The wording becomes redundant: the state “guarantees”, “endeavours to guarantee”, “strives 
to achieve” and “strives to assure” the rights. It “undertakes to protect” and “takes” measures in all 
intents and purposes.   
The third point refers to the right itself. Indeed, declarations on major rights begin with the subject of 
the right (that is, the human being, person or citizen) to whom a substantial right is attributed. The 
Tunisian constitution does not proceed in this manner. It either states a given right in abstract terms 
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or it entrusts the state with the care of protecting it. It is as if the human being (not mentioned as such) 
were not the subject of the initial right. There is an almost sole exception of this one provision, which 
starts by naming the holders of the right as: “Citizens (male and female) (rather than men and women 
as the hasty media reported) have equal rights and duties” (Article 21).    
  
      EUSPRING 
 
 
Drafting the constitution within the NCA was a slow, complex and confrontational process. Elected 
on 23 October 2011 for just a year, the NCA first had to adopt a law on the provisional organisation 
of powers1. Within the NCA, Ennahdha took the lion’s share in the six constitutional commissions, 
each composed in proportion to each party’s electoral score (nine members out of 22). Debates within 
the commissions started in January 2012. The NCA was driven by two crossing divides - a political 
divide (between majority and opposition) and a cultural polarity (between conservative and secular 
forces). The three successive drafts reflected this dual polarity (6 August 2012, 14 December 2012 
and 22 April 2013). The fourth draft (1 June 2013), although it introduced major improvements, did 
not succeed in achieving a consensus. The fact that a third version (April 2013) was required to ensure 
recognition of the “principles of universal human rights” (but not the rights themselves) is an 
illustration of the extent of these divergences. Indeed, “in as far as they are in harmony with the 
cultural specificities of the Tunisian people”. In its final report, which was drawn up on the eve of 
the second draft, the Rights and Freedoms Commission stated the principles that guided their work: 
Islamic values (1), the aspirations of the revolution (2) and the universal principles of Human Rights 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (3)2. By the fourth draft (1 June 2013), the 
Rights and Freedoms Commission claimed an almost general consensus on all of the articles, 
according to the complementary report (Number 3). The Joint Coordination and Drafting 
Commission handed in its general report (14 June)3. However, more than a dozen fundamental 
disputes were still unresolved. An ad hoc “consensus commission” (lajnet tawafuqat) within the 
NCA, chaired by Mustapha Ben Jaafar (President of the NCA), made no headway. This was because 
the Islamists, once again, raised the issue of the Sharia being the source of legislation (which did not 
figure in the third draft) and the constitutionalisation of the Higher Islamic Council4.  
  
                                                        
1 The 16 December 2011 law repeals the legislative decree of 23 March 2011, provisionally organizing powers until the 
holding of elections. 
2 General report of the Rights and Freedoms Commission, 13/11/2012.765858658 
3 See the general report on the draft constitution, Coordination and Drafting Commission, 14 June 2013. 
4 http://www.kapitalis.com/tribune/8847-entre-charia-ou-pas-charia-la-tunisie-balance.html 
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Civil Society and the NCA 
The NCA did not cut itself off from civil society. It organised two open days on 14 and 15 September 
2012 with more than 300 associations that expressed reservations on the first draft (August 2012). 
With the second draft, it launched the watchwords: “towards a participative drafting of the 
constitution”. It initiated an open debate within the NCA with civil society stakeholders (14/15 
December 2012). Some NCA members travelled to the regions (26 meetings) and abroad to listen to 
the complaints of citizens, which were handed into the commissions in March 2013, to help improve 
the third draft (April 2013)5. Similarly, a window was open on the NCA website to invite proposals 
to be passed onto the commissions6.  
On reading the documents, it is apparent that opinions differed more on general principles than on 
liberties. In the paragraph concerning general principles, civil society was divided on the place of 
Islam (between those in favour of and hostile to the Sharia), on nationalist ideology (whether or not 
to mention the criminalisation of the “Zionist entity”) and the reference to international human rights 
instruments. With regard to freedoms, two major trends confronted each other: one wanting to curtail 
liberties (through third party rights, respect of what is held sacred and public order) and the majority 
trend for which liberties were the priority. This calls for two comments: the first is the “observations 
and proposals of expatriates” which are more progressive. The first points raised were in the following 
order: criminalise insults to Tunisians of Jewish faith, as well as the accusation of impiety, mention 
parity and freedom of conscience. The second concerns the role of the mentioned civil society, with 
reference to the travel that is carried out in the regions, as follows: “the State, in cooperation with 
civil society, sets up mechanisms able to guarantee the implementation of rights and freedoms 
recognised in this chapter”.   
An Autonomous Civil Society  
Civil society also distinguished itself through autonomous action. Although we will limit ourselves 
here to actions of a general nature, we will later consider them by theme. From interviews with civil 
society actors, it appears that they are proud of their lobbying activities and, as a whole, are satisfied 
                                                        
5See the documents that are available on the NCA website: Rapport Général sur le Projet de la Constitution, op 
cit; Observations Générales sur la Constitution, 18 Mars 2013, and two tables: Observations et Propositions des 
Régions et  Observations et Propositions des Expatriés. 
6 The document, Dialogue avec la Société Civile  (26 Mars 2013), summarises the 217 participations (exactly the 
number of deputies).  
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with the final version of the constitution. They made recommendations, which we will raise in the 
conclusion.7 Civil society was mobilised from the outset, in contrast to the idea that the Tunisian 
public withdrew from a scholarly discussion on the constitution8. Even before the election of the 
constituent assembly, several constitutions were in circulation9. The one that was put forward by the 
UGTT was presented just after the election of the constituent assembly in the margin of its 22nd 
congress (December 2011)10. Once the work began, a Civil Constituent Assembly was established in 
January 201211. With as many members as the elected NCA, the same commissions and the same 
working method, it drafted a series of proposals with a sole reference, according to the president, the 
universal declaration of human rights and international conventions12. 
The Bawsala Association also did some remarkable work in monitoring the constitution. On a daily 
basis and in real time, they covered all of the NCA’s activities13. The Tunisian Human Rights League 
(LTDH) handed the NCA a memorandum requesting for observer status, which it was not granted. 
However, it achieved greater influence in view of its participation in the Quartet, which sponsored 
the National Dialogue14. At the initiative of the Arab Institute of Human Rights (AIHR), many 
organisations worked to obtain the signature of the Pact of Tunisia for Rights and Liberties, 
proclaimed on 25 July 201215. Composed of nine articles, it called for the respect of fundamental 
rights, a life of dignity, security, equality, citizenship, development, freedom of expression and 
respect of the environment16. The AIHR unsuccessfully requested that the Pact be included in the 
constitution17. Tension heightened on 25 July 2013 when 30 civil associations signed The Declaration 
                                                        
7 In the annex, see the interviews that were carried out in January 2014: Sami Tahri, UGTT Spokesperson, Samir 
Bouaziz (Institut arabe des Droits de l’Homme), Ali Zeddini, Secrétaire Général de la Ligue Arabe des Droits de 
l’Homme, Wafa Ben Amor, Présidente de l’Assemblée Nationale Constituante Civile, Wafa Frawes, Membre du 
Bureau Directeur l’Association des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD). 
8 Mha Yahya, Beyond Tunisia’s Constitution: The Devil is into Details, April, 14, 2014, Carnegie Middle East Center, 
http://www.carnegie-mec.org. 
9 See the constitutions on the ATDC website: http://www.chawki.gaddes.org/6.html. 
10 Interview with Sami Tahri, UGTT Spokesperson, January 2014. 
11The first session was held on 22 January at the Faculté des Sciences Juridiques. See its proposals 
http://www.gnet.tn/temps-fort/tunisie/la-constituante-civile-avance-sur-son-projet-de-constitution/id-menu-325.html. 
12Interview with Wafa Ben Amor, President’Assemblée Nationale Constituante Civile, Janvier 2014. 
13Bawsala provided biographies of the deputies, monitored the presence of deputies and the vote, and put documents 
and reports of the session and working documents online: see Bawsala.tn. 
14Interview of Ali Zeddini, Secretary General of the LTDH, January 2014. 
15The most important were the ’Union générale des travailleurs tunisiens (UGTT), la Ligue tunisienne pour la défense 
des droits de l’Homme (LTDH), le Syndicat des journalistes tunisiens (SNJT), l’Ordre national des avocats tunisiens 
(ONAT) et l’Association tunisienne des femmes démocrates (ATFD). See document: http://aihr-
iadh.org/pctfr/pacte_de_tunisie_des_droits_et_libertes.pdf 
16See “Pour une Tunisie des libertés” by Souhayr Belhassen, Présidente de la FIDH; Abdel Basset Ben Hassen; Président 
de l'Institut arabe des droits de l'homme, LE MONDE | 26.02.2013 http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2013/02/26/pour-
une-tunisie-des-libertes_1839083_3232.html. 
17Interview de Samir Bouaziz (Institut arabe des Droits de l’Homme), Janvier 2014. 
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of Tunis in which they opposed the fourth version (June 2013), which was supposed to be the final 
one18. With respect to freedoms, it refused any kind of delegation granted to the law to fix the system 
of freedoms. With regard to Islam, the petition referred to the teachings of Islam (taâlim al islam), to 
its ends (maqasid), to the Arab Muslim identity (al hawiya al arabiya al islamiya), to the Umma al 
islamiya and the sacred (muqadasat)19. Criticism from the Dastourna (Our Constitution) network and 
the league of freedoms and human development went along the same lines20. 
The Islamists were not to be outdone. In a note addressed to the NCA bureau by the President of the 
Tunisian Front of Islamic Associations, Mokhtar Jebali, the group referred to the Koranic verse: “So 
judge between them by that which God hath revealed, and follow not their desires” (5: 49), on which 
it based its five demands: stipulate “clearly that Islam is the State religion” (1), make the Sharia the 
“principal and single source of legislation” (2), require that the President of the Republic be “male, 
Tunisian, Muslim” and his wife a Muslim (3), ensure that the State undertake to “protect Islam and 
prohibit the dissemination of any non-Sunni propaganda of a heretical obedience” and enact a law 
making any attack on what Muslims hold sacred a criminal offence (4) and finally, any convention 
“contrary to the Sharia and to the constants of Islam” should not be conformed to (5)21. 
Similarly, experts played an important role as “gate-keepers”22. They all advocated in favour of a 
constitution that limits the weight of religion, while expanding the area of freedoms. Nothing can 
better illustrate the influence of the experts than the comments of Yadh Ben Achour, whose point of 
view was taken as authoritative arguments23. The same applied to those of Sadok Belaid, the author 
of a draft constitution and of numerous commentaries on the drafts. We should also mention a 
document that was made by three professors who were invited by the Joint Commission for 
Coordination and Drafting of the Constitution to provide an opinion on the third draft24. In the same 
spirit, the Tunisian Constitutional Law Association contributed periodical comments on the progress 
                                                        
18See list of signatories and the text https://delphysyllepse.wordpress.com/2013/08/02/pour-une-republique-civile-et-
solidaire-en-tunisie/ 
19The petition cites articles 23 on privacy, inviolability of the home, confidentiality of correspondence, communications 
and personal information, the choice of place of residence, free movement; article 25, on the right to political asylum; 
article 30, on freedom of expression, information and publication; article 31, on the right to access information; article 
34, on the freedom to establish a political party; and article 36, on the freedom to assemble and demonstrate. 
20 Cf. La Presse de Tunisie, 13 Mai 2013. 
21 Lettre dated 9/03/2012, bureau d’ordre de l’ANC, 17/03/2012 réf.96/400/2012. 
22 See list of experts called upon by the NCA, Annexe 6, Website ANC. 
23See his contribution Maghreb 26/03/2013 in French (25 Avril 2013):  
http://emmabenji.canalblog.com/archives/2013/04/25/27007403.html 
24 Hafedh Ben Salah, Leïla Chikhaoui, and Ahmed Essoussi, Ta‘lîq hawla muswwadat al-dustûr, al-sâdira bi-târikh 23 
afrîl 2013[Commentaire autour du projet de constitution du 23 avril 2013]. Document downloadable from the site 
Marsad :  http://www.marsad.tn/fr/docs/5190b1df7ea2c422e7d0532e. 
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of work25. Hence, the association criticised the “serious shortcomings” of the first draft (August 
2012). It repeated its criticism of the second draft (December 2012) and commented on the fourth 
draft (June 2013)26. A group of experts from the ranks of the ATD annotated the last version27.  
National Dialogue 
The National Dialogue was triggered by the assassination of the Deputy Mohamed Brahmi, on 25 
July 2013, following the withdrawal of 60 opposition parliamentarians28. Indeed, the fourth version 
(June 2013) failed to smooth out all the differences - no more than the negotiations with the 
Compromise Committee (lajnet al-tawafuqat) was able to do. With the aim of avoiding escalating to 
extreme positions, informal negotiations (direct and indirect) finally led to the establishment of a 
Quartet29. After being repeatedly postponed, the National Dialogue officially got underway on 25 
October 201330. Before it began, the Compromise Committee had already identified 16 points of 
divergence, besides the corollary points that were finally ironed out by the National Dialogue31.  
This was the context in which, on 3 January, the deputies resumed discussion on the ironed out 
constitution, in plenary session, article by article and at a good pace. More than 1,000 amendments 
were filed, out of which only 286 were retained. The constitution does not fundamentally innovate. 
The first two chapters (besides the preamble) refer to the principles of the republic, freedoms and the 
status of Islam. With regard to freedoms, the constitution abides by the spirit of article 16 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the citizen (“A society in which the observance of the 
law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all”). With respect to 
Islam, it relies on an “Islamic secularism”, instituted by the 1959 constitution, reframed in a 
democratic context.  
                                                        
25 See the ATDC site: http://www.atdc.org.tn/ 
26 See document: recommendations on the second draft: http://touensa.org/2013/02/13/tunisie-les-recommandations-
emises-par-lassociation-tunisienne-de-droit-constitutionnel-sur-le-deuxieme-brouillon-de-la-constitution/; see 
commentaries on the fourth draft :  
http://www.albawsala.com/uploads/documents/Colloque_de_lecture_du_projet_du_1er_Juin_2013.pdf 
27 Yadh Ben Achour et al., Propositions Autour du Projet de la Constitution du 1er juin 2013, Tunis, Editions Hanns 
Seidel Stiftung. 
28 See Hamadi Redissi, What Role for Tunisa’s National Dialogue Under the Interim Government? AIR, Policy 
Alternatives, May 2014. 
29 It is made up of four organisations (l’UGTT, l’UTICA, l’Ordre des Avocats et la LTDH). 
30 Dialogue soon suspended on 5 November 2013 due to a lack of consensus on the designation of a candidate for the 
prime minister: http://www.businessnews.com.tn/pourparlers-tardifs-et-debut-du-dialogue-national-vendredi-25-
octobre-maj,520,41708,3 
31 See Hamadi Redissi, Raison Publique et Laïcité, la Constitution Tunisienne de 2014, in Esprit, Juillet 2014. 
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The Focus Groups 
The work of the six thematic focus groups remained within the general context of civil society and 
constituent assembly debates32. They were as follows:  
1. Minorities 
Is the term minorities a common one and what do we mean by minorities? Although they are many, 
no list of minorities has been drawn up: religious, colour or ethnic and even sexual (homosexuals 
were mentioned). However, little is known of their rights. In Tunisia, the general tendency is to 
emphasise homogeneity, the communal experience, tolerance and the absence of the issue of 
minorities. What about their status? On a constitutional level, they are inexistent, even after the 
attacks committed against Sufi and Christian shrines. Are they integrated? Any integration is relative, 
the situation of people of colour is certainly the most deplorable.  
2. Women 
How does the situation stand after the revolution? Where does the legislation stand? What rights 
should women enjoy? First, parity is claimed as a form of positive discrimination. However, amongst 
women, discordant voices expressed their hostility to parity. Others feared that the progressions 
women had made would be lost. Finally, on a social level, the gap between the system of rights and 
the actual conditions that women experienced in the public sphere became apparent.       
3. Freedom of Expression  
Were the excess of freedom, the limits that need to be imposed and the sanctions to apply debated? 
It was deplored that penal legislation was still in force, even after the enactment of legislation with a 
more liberal tone (legislative decrees 115 and 116, 2011). The limits are classical (infringement of 
the rights of others, public order, etc.) and regulation would be ensured by the highest judicial body 
(the HAICA) and the judiciary.  
4. Education and Health  
What type of health system: public or private? Free or pay-for? The inequality of citizens within a 
two-tiered health system was deplored, whereby the rich have access to private health care while the 
majority of the population have to resort to uncompetitive and under-funded hospitals. It is the duty 
                                                        
32 The EU Spring team and Tunisian partners carried out the focuses for the duration of the project.   
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of the state to provide the means of ensuring a public health system for all. The same question is 
applied to education: public, private or a combination of both? Pay-for or free? Opinions differed. 
What is the role of civil society in the area of health and education? It is a lobbying role, a pressure 
group, which monitors and acts with the interested parties. It also has a role as a partner.   
5. Unemployment 
In favour or not of unemployment benefits and how to finance them? Those who opposed to the 
principle refer to their personal experience of being unemployed and having successfully found a job. 
Those who were in favour believe it is one of the demands of the revolution. According to some, a 
temporary measure is necessary but others argue that is insufficient. Who would be entitled to it? Job 
seekers, other jobless categories or the injured? Is social security coverage adequate? A review of the 
employment system on a new base was suggested.  
6. Political Participation  
Since participation is a right, what are the ways and means of implementing it? The answer is: 
political parties, associations, unions and the media. Political parties take decisions, associations 
monitor, citizens participate and the media inform. What forms of participation are there? There are 
many, starting with the ballot, a “classical” mode that does not exclude civil protest, especially during 
a revolutionary period.   
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Islam and the State  
The relationship between Islam and the civil state provoked considerable tension between the 
conservatives and modernists, and between the NCA and civil society. The challenge was to reconcile 
the reference to Islam and the civil character of the state. The final text retains the first article of the 
1959 constitution in the four drafts: “Tunisia is a free, independent, sovereign state; its religion is 
Islam, its language Arabic, and its system is republican. Introduced into the third draft, article two 
picks up immediately with a clause that could seem somewhat like a coincidental opposition: Tunisia 
is a civil state based on citizenship, the will of the people, and the supremacy of law”. In stipulating 
that these two articles might not be amended, the final text adopted, in plenary, the firm establishment 
of them as strict markers of Tunisian identity, a historical identity (article one), “expanded” in a 
democratic context (article two).   
Article one has always been interpreted by legal doctrine as referring to Islam as the religion of 
Tunisia and not Islam as the religion of the state. As a compromise, article one was adopted almost 
unanimously (less one vote and two abstentions)33. The conservatives within the NCA attempted to 
push the advantage in two directions: the first was to close the doctrinal debate on the interpretation 
of article one by making Islam the religion of the state and not of Tunisia. This position was upheld 
in the Preamble Commission34 and was reverted to in the fourth draft (article 148). Under pressure 
from civil society, as well as from the National Dialogue, the mention was deleted. Second direction: 
make the Sharia a source of legislation according to the Egyptian model (article two of the 2012 and 
2013 constitutions)35. Two amendments along those lines were rejected in plenary (amendments five 
and 42). Nonetheless, reference to the Sharia was almost retained in the “constants of Islam” 
(thawabet) (in the three drafts). The wording was opposed and the Compromise Commission’s first 
decision was to replace it with: “Expressing our people’s commitment to the teachings of Islam”36. 
                                                        
33 After verification, the only deputy to have voted against article one proved to belong to the Mahaba movement 
(formerly El-Aridha led by Hechmi al-Hamdi). Of the two abstentions, one belonged to Mahaba and the other was 
independent: see Bawsala.tn.   
34 The initial report and the final report of the preamble, general principles and review of the constitution, 20 
October 2012. 
35  See plenary session, debate on the constitution, 3/07/2013. 
36 Decision n° 1 of the Compromise Commission of 27/09/2013. 
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The Sharia was also indirectly mentioned with regard to the status of conventions in national law. In 
the minds of Islamists, conventions cannot contradict religious values. Other members of the 
assembly regarded such a provision unnecessary37. An end was finally put to the debate by the 
provision that granted duly ratified treaties “a supra legislative and infra-constitutional authority” 
(article 20 of the final version). The plan to constitutionalise the Higher Islamic Council, which 
figures in Ennahdha’s version of the constitution (article 28), was not debated in plenary. Article two 
confirms this orientation. During commission debates, some Islamists put forward the following 
argument: if the Sharia is not the source of legislation, then any explicit mention of the civil state 
should be removed or it should be specified “Civil State that refers to Islam”. Otherwise, the reference 
might infer that the State is separated from religion38.   
Religious Freedom and Protection of the Sacred.  
Article six refers to religious freedom and its limits and innovates by specifically recognizing the 
freedom of conscience. The article also stirred great controversy and underwent several evolutions. 
The second (December 2012) and third drafts (April 2013) stipulate: The state is the guarantor of 
religion. It guarantees freedom of belief and conscience, the free exercise of religious practice; it 
protects the sacred and is responsible for the neutrality of places of worship from all partisan 
purposes”. The fourth draft (June 2013) introduced a “freedom of conscience” between the freedom 
of belief and free religious practice. Within the Rights and Freedoms Commission, some sought to 
criminalise attacks against the sacred, whilst others regarded this as a restriction on the freedom of 
expression39. This initial wording was approved on 4 January 201440. At that point, it did not mention 
Takfir or the values of moderation. An amendment (number 23) sought to delete the “freedom of 
conscience and free exercise of religious practice”. It was rejected 41 . The only group to have 
unanimously voted against this amendment (10 out of 10 votes) was the left wing group, known as 
“Kotla” (democratic bloc). On the other hand, the 35 votes in favour of deleting the provision were 
to be found in all of the groups, the greatest number being amongst Ennahdha’s secular allies42. A 
                                                        
37 Minutes 1, Commission Etude des principaux axes du préambule, 26 mars 2012,  marsad.tn  
38 Minutes 3, Etude des principaux axes: Préambule, principes fondamentaux et amendement de la constitution, 25 
Avril 2012. It is necessary to put the link in all of the materials that you quote in order to let readers consult them.  
39Final report of the Rights and Freedoms Commission. 13/09/2012. NB: it is surprising that the issue was tackled in 
this commission when article six was part of the chapter on general principles.   
40(149 for, 23 against and 13 abstentions). Votes against and abstentions were found to be amongst all of the groups. 
41(104 against, 35 for and 23 abstentions). 
42Nahdha (48 against, four for, 22 abstentions), CPR (six against, three for, two abstentions), Wafa (nil against, six for, 
two abstentions), Intikal (two against, eight for, no abstention), Tahaluf (Alliance) (four against, one for, no abstention), 
Kotla (10 against out of 10), the independents (28 against, 10 for, no abstention).  
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second amendment (number 95) set out to add a paragraph stipulating: “Any form of call to Takfir 
(accusation of impiety) and incitement of hatred and violence are strictly prohibited”. It was adopted 
with a comfortable majority43. The vote revealed a clear polarised between Ennahdha opposing the 
amendment and the democratic left wing bloc voting unanimously in favour44. A third amendment 
(62) further fuelled the issue by proposing to do away with the mention of the freedom of conscience. 
It was rejected45. The two extremes were polarised with the democratic bloc (12 against) opposing 
Wafa, an Ennahdha ally (seven in favour, none against and one abstention). Ennahdha’s vote was 
slightly more nuanced46. The more laboured Amendment 127 finally “liberalised” and “secularised” 
the article. It sought to extend the protection of the state to all religions and to shield places of worship 
from political struggles. It was rejected by a strong majority - not one Nahdhaoui deputy voted in 
favour, while the democratic bloc voted unanimously in favour of the new wording47. 
The next day, 5 January, discussion resumed on article six. Again, a vote was taken. The wording, 
which was supposed to be the final version, raised opposition from the Salafists and part of Ennahdha. 
The debate on article six continued on 23 January 2014, three days ahead of the final vote on the 
constitution, with a “consensus” amendment to paragraph two of the article: “The state undertakes to 
disseminate the values of moderation and tolerance and the protection of the sacred, and the 
prohibition of all violations thereof. It undertakes equally to prohibit and fight against calls for Takfir 
and the incitement of violence and hatred”. The amendment was adopted with a majority48. Article 
six was then voted in its final version, as it figures in the constitution49.  
Minorities 
No more than the former, the new constitution grants no rights to minorities as such (religious, ethnic 
and linguistic). These fall into three broad categories: the Arab-Muslim identity, the freedom of 
religious practice of non-Islamic religions and the ethnic-linguistic minorities. We will restrict 
ourselves to the last two categories.   
                                                        
43 96 for, 60 against and 31 abstentions. 
44 Ennahdha (Ag 53, F: 10, A: 18) as opposed to Kotla (12 F) and, to a lesser extent, the independents (F: 38, Ag: 3, A: 
8).  
45 96 against, 49 for and 39 abstentions. 
46 Ennahdha: Ag: 35, F: 17, A: 27) (against 35, for 17, abstention, 27). 
47 General vote: 104 against, 71 for and 12 abstentions. Ennahdha (Ag: 77, F: none, A: 5), compared to Bloc (F: 12). All 
of the other groups were divided.  
48150 for, 14 against and 15 abstentions. 
49152 for, 15 against and 16 abstentions. NB: It may be noted that the votes against were evenly distributed between all 
of the groups, including the democratic bloc from which one out of 12 voted against.   
  
      EUSPRING 
 
There is no mention of religious or ethnic-linguistic minorities. It may be considered that religious 
minorities are protected by the freedom of religion (article six). At independence, the 1958 law, which 
pertains to the organisation of Judaism, dissolved the Council of the Jewish community of Tunis50. It 
replaced it on a national level by a provisional Commission. Subsequently, this was permanently 
established (articles 17 and 18). In the case of Catholicism (institutional expression of the Christian 
majority), it was governed by quite a different regime, based on a Modus vivendi and an additional 
protocol. The ratifications of this have remained the same since 9 July 196451. It recognises “the free 
practice of the Catholic religion in Tunisia”, (article one of the Modus vivendi).  
What of the ethic-linguistic minorities? From interviews with NCA members, it appears that Islamists 
and Arab nationalists were hostile to any mention of minority rights, while the “progressives” were 
in favour of them52.  
The former regard the rights of non-Arab minorities as a “danger” liable to foment “dissention” and 
“divide” Tunisians along ethnic lines, or even to serve “foreign agenda”53. On the other hand, the 
modernists defended Tunisia’s pluralist identity with rights that were founded on universality. 
Associations for the defence of minorities and Berber identity took to lobbying in the unsuccessful 
attempt to write the rights of minorities into the constitution.54. The Vice President of the Tunisian 
Association for Amazigh Culture addressed a letter to each of the 217 members of the NCA, which 
remained unanswered. In this letter, he called for the creation of a Berber cultural centre55. It is 
noteworthy that the establishment of a body for minorities was never mentioned amongst the 30 or 
so bodies that proposed to the Commission of constitutional Bodies56.  
  
                                                        
50Articles 17 and 18 of law n°58-78 of 11 July 1958 relative to the Jewish religion, JORT, 11/07/1958. 
51Décret n° 64-245 du 23 Juillet 1964, J.O.R.T 36, 24/07/1964. 
52See the list of people who were interviewed by Sabrina Fathallah, Transition démocratique et minorités berbères 
après le 1 Janvier, Mémoire de Mastère en science politique, Faculté de droit et des sciences politiques de Tunis, 2014.  
53See the accusations of Salim Hakimi in the magazine El-Fejr spokesperson for’Ennahdha, “Qui fomente la discorde 
Amazigh en Tunisie?” El-Fejr, 25/11/2012.  
54The six legal associations are: l’Association Tunisienne de la Culture Amazigh (présidée par Khadija Ben Saïdane), 
l’Association Amazigh de Djerba (Président Slaheddine Ben Mimoun), l’Association Tamazigh pour la Culture et les 
Arts (Président Ahmed Oulghazi) et l’Association de Développement du Patrimoine Musical et Poétique Amazigh 
(Président Lotfi Riahi), l’Association de Sauvegarde du Village Amazigh Taoujout (Président Mohamed Gouirah), 
l’Association AZRO pour la Culture Amazigh (Président Arafat Mahroug).   
55See letter reference n°212 in the NCA registry in annex to Sabrina Fathallah, op cit.  
56See report of the Commission of Constitutional bodies, 26/09/2012doc, available on Marsad.tn, Rapports de la 
Commission des Instances Constitutionnelles.  
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Women’s Rights: Partial Equality  
Tunisia has made major progress in the area of women’s rights, particularly with the Personal Status 
Code (1958)57. With regard to the constitution, three articles are devoted to women’s rights (21, 33 
and 46).  
Article 21 of the constitution stipulates that “All citizens, male and female, have equal rights and 
duties, and are equal before the law without discrimination”. This article was voted on 6 January 
without amendment by an overwhelming majority of members present58. Article 28 of the first draft 
(August 2012) stipulated “a complementarity between man and woman”. The second draft 
(December 2012) established equality between male and female citizens without any discrimination 
(article 5). The third draft (April 2013) also stipulated “men and women are associated in the building 
of society and the State” (article 11). The fourth draft (June 2013) restores things to order. This was 
achieved thanks to the action of women. On annual Woman’s Day, several organisations at the NCA 
presented the “citizen and equality draft constitution”. Here, they advocated total equality, parity in 
conformity with international standards (4/08/2012)59. In October 2012, the international NGOs 
presented a “position paper”60. Despite improvements, three shortcomings need to be pointed out: 
equality is between male and female citizens and not between a man and woman; it is “before” the 
law and not by the law; “discrimination” is not specified.  
The second article that refers to women’s rights (article 33) is divided into two paragraphs. The first 
paragraph provides for political participation in general (the right to elect and to stand for election) 
and raised no issues.61 The second is more problematical and concerns women’s rights: “The State 
will ensure the representation of women in the elected assemblies”. This paragraph, presented in the 
                                                        
57Prohibition of polygamy, equal right to marriage and to legal divorce, minimum age at marriage, prohibition of forced 
marriage and duty of obedience. 
58159 for, 7 against and one abstention. The few negative votes do not belong to the large blocs:  Ennahdha had no votes 
missing and the only discordant vote of the democratic Bloc (Abdessalam) is even more relevant in as far as it 
demanded equality between men and women.   
59 ATFD, AFTURD, LTDH, Commission femmes de l’UGTT, section femmes Amnesty et conseil des libertés  
journee-internationale-de-la-femme-tunisie/  
60 See text:  https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/noteposition.pdf 
 
61 It figures in the second draft of the constitution (December 2012) (article 43) and the third (April 2013) (article 47) 
and the fourth (article 33).   
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form of amendment 139, was voted separately beforehand62. When voted on as a whole (including 
both paragraphs), the outcome was widely in favour63.  
Finally, article 46 (44 before reordering). It can be broken down into four elements. “The State 
undertakes to protect the acquired rights of women and endeavours to reinforce and to develop them” 
(1); “The State guarantees equal opportunity of women and men to accede to any responsibilities in 
all areas” (2); “The State endeavours to achieve parity between women and men in elected 
assemblies” (3); “The State takes the necessary measures to eliminate violence against women” (4). 
Disagreement arose within the Commission on whether the Personal Status Code, parity and complete 
equality between men and women should be enshrined in the constitution64. The article was adopted 
with a comfortable majority65. It was the result of a consensual amendment66. Elements one, two and 
four were taken textually from the preceding drafts67. The third point regarding parity ties back to 
article 16 of the legislative decree pertaining to the election of the constituent assembly. This provides 
for the classification of candidates on the lists by alternating between a man and a woman68. On the 
strength of this achievement, civil society continued to lobby for “horizontal” parity (parity between 
heads of lists) as a means of counteracting the almost systematic choice of a man to head the list 
according to “vertical” parity (through alternation on each electoral list)69. The same applies to the 
elimination of violence against women. Before the revolution, domestic violence was a punishable 
offence70. Women’s associations demanded the modification of other provisions of the penal code71 
and a special law against violence72. 
  
                                                        
62 125 for, 32 against, 22 abstentions. 
63166 for, nine against, six abstentions. Of the nine against, four were from Ennahdha, one from CPR and four 
independents.  
64 Rapport général op cit. 
65 127 for, 43 against of which almost half from Ennahdha (20) and 24 abstentions. 
66 116 for, 40 against (of which 20 Ennahdha) and 32 abstentions.  
67 Articles seven and 37 (draft two) and articles 42 (draft three) and 45 (draft four).  
68 Décret-loi n°35 du 10 Mai 2011, JORT n° 33 du 10 Mai 2011, p. 648.  
69 See list of associations concerned with parity: http://www.tuniscope.com/article/43567/vie/associations/parite-egalite-
572712 
70 Article 218 of the Tunisian penal code provides that violence between spouses is punishable with a two-year prison 
sentence and a 2,000 dinar fine. 
71   Articles 226 and 227 of the penal code suspend prosecution in case of violation of a minor through marriage of the 
perpetrator with the victim.  
72 Interview with Yosra Frawes, membre de l’ATFD, Janvier 2015. 
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Civil Rights 
Provisions concerning civil rights (22 to 30 in the final version) did not stir much debate. This is 
understandable in an NCA made up mostly of opponents who had suffered bodily and in their private 
lives from repressive methods. Only one article (21, future article 22 after reordering) regarding the 
right to life created some problems. Within the Freedoms Commission, it was agreed that “the right 
to life is sacred”. However, this was accompanied by four qualifications: as long as it is not in 
contradiction with the Koran (1), it is up to the legislator to determine the conditions under which it 
is to be implemented (2), it should not be violated except in the cases provided for by law (3), the 
death penalty is maintained (4). Article 22 stipulates: “the right to life is sacred, this right cannot be 
violated except in extreme cases provided for by the law”73. It was adopted by a majority vote74. 
Ennahdha’s vote was unanimous (81 in favour with no vote against or abstention), while the opposing 
votes from various quarters were against the death penalty. The camp in favour of the abolition of the 
death penalty has been active in Tunisia since the inception of the Tunisian National Coalition 
Against the Death Penalty75 in 2009. The latter has undertaken several actions, the latest being in 
October 2013 on the World Day against the death penalty, calling parties to write abolition into the 
constitution76. Yet the rejection of both amendments confirmed the NCA’s anti-abolitionist stance. 
The first (85) stipulates that “the right to life is sacred. It is protected by law and this right may not 
be violated”77. The second (136) sought to delete the mention “this right may not be violated except 
in extreme cases provided for by the law”78. Once again, the democratic bloc voted unanimously for 
                                                        
73 The right to life was the “first right” (article 16, second draft), then it as “sacred” (article 22, third draft and 21, fourth 
draft).  
74 135 for, 28 against, 11 abstentions. 
75 The coalition brings together seven associations: La Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’homme (LTDH), la Section 
Tunisienne d’Amnesty International (AIST), l’Institut Arabe des Droits de l’Homme (IADH), l’Association Tunisienne 
des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD), l’Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche et le Développement 
(AFTURD), Le Syndicat national des journalistes tunisiens (SNJT) 
- la Fédération Tunisienne des Ciné-clubs (FTCC). Elles sont 13 associations en 2014 avec l’adhésion de la 
Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), l’Organisation Tunisienne Contre la Torture (OCTT), me Conseil National 
des Libertés (CNLT) et le réseau Doustourna. 
76 The call was signed by the IFHRL  (International federation of Human Rights Leagues)e l’Homme), Amnesty, 
Section Tunisie et la Coalition Nationale Tunisienne contre la peine de mort :  https://www.fidh.org/La-Federation-
internationale-des-ligues-des-droits-de-l-homme/maghreb-moyen-orient/tunisie/pour-l-abolition-de-la-peine-de-mort-
en-tunisie-appel-aux-partis-14072. See the regional conference, which was organised in September 2013 by the13 
associations “En marche pour l’abolition de la peine de mort”: 
http://www.citoyensdesdeuxrives.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3861:conference-regionale-l-
en-marche-vers-labolition-de-la-peine-de-mort-r-tunis-26--27-septembre-2014&catid=200:societe-civile&Itemid=172 
77  102 against, 50 for and 15 abstentions. NB: It should be mentioned that two nahdhouis voted in favour of this 
amendment and a member of the democratic bloc voted against.  
78 99 against, 49 for and 22 abstentions. 
  
      EUSPRING 
 
the removal of the paragraph. The following articles referring to civil rights (22-30) raised no 
objections. 
Civil Liberties  
Covered by articles 31-35, civil liberties had already been provided for by a post-14 January liberal 
legislation. Concerning freedom of expression and information, decrees 115 and 116 are even more 
forward-looking than the present constitution, in as far as they are in conformity with the international 
covenant on civil and political rights. Meanwhile, article 20 of the Constitution confers on treaties a 
supra-legislative and infra-constitutional rank79. Under these circumstances, the adoption of article 
30 (31 final version) on freedom of opinion, thought, expression, information and publication was 
unanimous. Such progress was made possible by the action of the NGO article 19 (Tunisia section) 
in favour of the amendment of the first versions of the articles (30, 31 and 127) in cooperation with 
a group of associations80. This step forward was commended by a joint statement (1/02/2014) from 
three organisations, recalling the need to reform legislation in force and institutions in order to provide 
for the protection of human rights81. 
Article 32 recognises academic freedom82. Just as for freedom of opinion and of expression (affirmed 
by decrees 115 and 116), freedom of associations and parties is recognised by two post-14 January 
legislative decrees83. The right to organise in a union is guaranteed by article 35 of the fourth version, 
including the right to strike. This constitutes progress, compared to the preceding versions, where the 
right to strike could not “endanger the life of people or their health or their security” (article 27, 
second draft), as well as “the law determines the conditions under which public service continuity is 
maintained” (article 33, third draft). In the Freedoms Commission, opinions differed on the right to 
                                                        
79 Legislative decree n° 2011-115 of 2 November 2011 relative to freedom of the press, printing and publication and 
decree 116 relative to the establishment of a Higher independent body for audiovisual media.  
80The Civic Coalition for the Protection of Freedom of Expression, The National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists – 
SNJT, The Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), The General Syndicate of Culture and Information under UGTT, 
The Tunisian Syndicate for free radios – STRL, The Tunisian Centre for Freedom of the Press – CTLP, The Federation 
of Newspaper Editors, The Tunisian Magistrates' Association, The High Authority of Audiovisual Communication – 
HAICA, The African Centre for Training of Journalists and Communicators – CAPJC, The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights – OHCHR, Amnesty International, BBC Media Action, The Euro-Mediterranean 
Network for Human Rights – EMHRN, The Euro-Mediterranean Foundation of Support to Human Rights Defenders – 
EMHRF, The International Academy of Constitutional Law, The Council of Europe, UNESCO 
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37327/en/Tunisia. 
81 Bawsala, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch; see communiqué in bawsla.tn.  
82 Academic freedom figures in drafts two (article 30), three (article36) and four (article 32). 
83 Legislative decree n° 2011-87 of 24 September 2011 organizing political parties and legislative decree n° 2011-88 su 
24 Septembre 2011, portant organisation des associations. 
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strike - whether it should be absolute or restricted. During a first vote, this right did not apply to the 
National Army. Amendment (35) was adopted with a short majority (77 in favour, 73 against). It 
seeks to achieve a balance between freedom to work and restrictions for some non-mentioned bodies. 
It was removed during the final vote. Subsequently, other bodies were excluded from the right to 
strike (internal security forces and customs). Article 36 guarantees the right to peaceful 
demonstration84. Amendment 233, which entrusts the law with fixing the ways and means without 
violating the essence of the right, was rejected85.  
Economic and Social Rights  
Economic and social rights, as are laid down (articles 38-48) and adopted, reflect a radical social 
democrat vision that overburdens the state with obligations towards individuals, underprivileged 
groups and disadvantaged regions. The divergence is not fundamentally ideological. It lies between 
those who demand minimal state intervention and those who uphold the fullest commitment of the 
state 86 . The rights emanate from a theory of justice, based on the principles of freedom (or 
equivalence) and equality (or corrective difference of inequalities). The question was indirectly raised 
in commission87. Article 12 sets the stage. It provides that “the State shall seek to achieve social 
justice, sustainable development, a balance between regions, by referring to development indicators 
and relying on the principle of positive discrimination. It will also seek to exploit natural resources 
in the most efficient way”. All is covered.  
The right to health (article 37 before reordering) acquired its final wording after the introduction of a 
“consensual” amendment on the role of the state88. Two amendments were rejected because they 
overburdened the state: amendment (4): “The state ensures that preventive health care and treatment 
for all citizens and the national community will cover the costs of this fundamental amongst all human 
rights”. Amendment (89) extends free health care to all and the right to social security. The right to 
health was debated within civil society. Already in April 2012, the Tunisian association for the 
                                                        
84 170 for, four abstentions. 
85 This restriction figures in drafts two (article 25) three (article 31) and four (article 36). 
86 This is why we do not refer to the vote by groups. 
87 Procès verbal 2, Etude des principaux axes: Préambule, principes fondamentaux et amendement de la constitution, 23 
Avril 2012, marsad.tn. 
88This right is already guaranteed to “low income” categories by drafts one (article 31), two (article 37) and four (article 
37). 
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defence of the right to health (ATDDS) called for the right to health to be written into the constitution 
and the possibility for civil society to have recourse, were this right to be violated89. 
Article 38 (39, after reordering), which concerns education, was the subject of debate. The right as 
such was affirmed without difficulty (compulsory free public education and the obligations of the 
state in this respect). A second paragraph, however, polarised the conflicts because it established a 
cultural particularism, partially resulting from an amendment (87): “Also, the State shall endeavour 
to root young generations in their Arab Muslim identity, to strengthen, consolidate and generalise the 
Arabic language”. Only nine deputies from the assorted left voted against this article on 7 January 
2014. Rooting in identity was not mentioned at all in the second draft (article 29). The third and fourth 
drafts restrict themselves to requiring the state to strengthen and consolidate the Arabic language 
(respectively article 35 and 38). Once alerted, over 50 associations addressed an open letter to the 
President of the NCA, requesting that the article be revised90. The NCA bowed to the pressure. Article 
39 requires that the state both consolidate pupils in their identity and ensure “openness to foreign 
languages, human civilisations and the diffusion of a culture of Human Rights”.  
Directly connected to the right to join and form a union (article 36), the right to work (article 39) (40 
final) was voted in its final version, with the introduction of a consensual amendment91. The first 
amendment on assistance to the unemployed was rejected. Amendment 142 was rejected with a short 
majority: “Every citizen has a right to work under decent and fair conditions; and the State takes the 
necessary measures to guarantee equal opportunities”92. Drafted in another wording, the final version 
establishes the right to work “guaranteed on the basis of competence and fairness” and with “decent 
working conditions and a fair wage”. Articles 41 (42 final) (the right to culture and freedom of 
creation) 42 (promotion of sport), 43 (the right to water) and 44 (right to a healthy environment) were 
voted without modifications. Article 45 refers to women’s rights (already examined). The article on 
children’s rights (46) was adopted after a consensual amendment. Article 47 on the rights of people 
with disabilities was voted following a consensual amendment93.  
                                                        
89http://www.tixup.com/international-politique/15532-tunisie-inscrire-le-droit-a-la-sante-dans-la-nouvelle-
constitution.html. 
90See the text of the bilingual petition and the list of signatories : http://www.sidibouzidnews.org/petition-a-signer-
constitution-tunisienne-la-societe-civile-demande-la-revision-de-larticle-38/;  also 
http://touensa.org/2014/01/20/constitution-tunisienne-la-societe-civile-demande-la-revision-de-larticle-38/ See 
information also in  : http://www.africanmanager.com/160904.html  
91It is guaranteed by article 26 (second draft) and 32 (third draft) and 38 (fourth draft). 
9264 against, 62 for. 
93Recognised by article 39 (draft one), 44 (draft three) and 47 (draft four). 
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The discussion of the chapter on freedoms was closed on 8 January 2014. However, on 9 January, an 
article on the right to housing (that does not figure in the final version) was added: “Every citizen has 
the right to decent housing and the State will endeavour to guarantee this right”. On the 10 January, 
a second article was voted: “The State guarantees the freedom to work and the freedom of economic 
initiative”. On 20 January, members went back on some articles and reworded article 12 (social and 
regional justice), article 10 (equality in taxation and taxes) and 31 (information). On 22 January, 
article 31 on the right to information acquired its final wording. Paragraph four of the preamble was 
revised. The words “the revolution of 17 December-14 January” were added to the first paragraph of 
the preamble. Another vote was taken on paragraph two of the preamble. A paragraph was added to 
article 35 on the right to strike, depriving internal security forces and the customs of this right. On 23 
January, a vote was taken on article 35 as a whole. Article six was then, once again, examined. Article 
38 was fine-tuned in order to balance the educational particularism. A further vote was taken on the 
whole article and was adopted almost unanimously (one vote against). An article was added on “the 
freedom of work guaranteed by the State”.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this report was to describe the dynamics of a citizens’ movement that contributed to 
the establishment of rights and freedoms and the constitution. Now that it has entered into force, civil 
society actors have set themselves a new agenda: implement the rights into reality and consolidate 
them. Yet, two questions remain outstanding. The first concerns practice: will political actors respect 
the rights affirmed in the constitution? The second is of a normative nature: how to harmonise the 
new provisions of the constitution with legislation? An answer may be given to the first question 
without having to place our trust in the actors themselves. It is up to the representatives of the state, 
the political parties, the legislator and the judicial authorities to accept the new rules of the game and 
obey the constitution. With respect to the second question, present legislation is subdivided into three 
categories: laws that are “aligned with” the letter and/or the spirit of the new constitution, measures 
that are “in advance” of the constitution and a legislation that clearly falls short of the constitution. 
With regard to international human rights legislation, the constitution places international treaties 
above legislation but below the constitution. It is the role of the judge to interpret this provision in a 
manner compatible with the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, ratified by Tunisia. 
